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 National in Form, Putinist in Content: 
Minority Institutions ‘Outside Politics’ 
 FEDERICA  PRINA 
 Abstract 
 Over the past three decades, Russia has developed a set of institutions for the management of ethno-linguistic 
diversity based on the principle of ‘national cultural autonomy’. This article examines the positioning of 
these institutions within Russian society, arguing that while state-endorsed discourses locate them within the 
culture sphere—treated as distinct from political processes—there is in fact an interpenetration of ‘politics’ 
and ‘culture’. The article identi¿ es why these institutions position themselves within the ‘cultural sphere’ while 
also supporting the country’s meta-narratives on inter-ethnic tolerance and, effectively, the political  status quo . 
Soviet legacies of inter-ethnic relations continue to be socially embedded, yet within this framework some 
dissenting voices are also discerned. 
 T HIS ARTICLE ANALYSES THE POSITIONING WITHIN R USSIAN SOCIETY of institutions for the 
management of ethno-linguistic and cultural diversity that are based on ‘national cultural 
autonomy’. It is argued that, while state-endorsed discourses ostensibly locate these institutions 
within the cultural sphere—treated as distinct from political processes—in fact there is an 
interpenetration of ‘politics’ and ‘culture’. Ethnic institutions, whether directly or indirectly, 
are called upon to support meta-narratives on the country’s unity and inter-ethnic tolerance, 
as well as, effectively, the political  status quo . Therein lies a paradox: on the one hand, Russia 
has sought to place ethnic policies in the cultural sphere, situating minority representative 
institutions outside overt political processes and linking their activities to general notions 
of ‘cultural development’. On the other hand, these institutions are an integral part of the 
country’s socio-political order: through them, ethnic communities cultivate narratives of 
belonging and nurture a collective identity, yet they are compelled to conform to prevailing 
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societal discourses. Potential deviation from existing rules of engagement can be denounced 
as crossing the invisible boundary between ‘culture’ and ‘political activity’, with both concepts 
interpreted broadly and À exibly. As such, ethnic institutions must be understood in the context 
of the Russian leadership’s centralised political system. Meanwhile, the Soviet folkloristic, 
ethnographic approach to inter-ethnic relations continues, revealing the enduring relevance 
of Soviet legacies. 
 The article is divided into three parts. First, it brieÀ y outlines diversity management 
and ethnic institutions in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia, and the signi¿ cance of drawing a 
demarcation line between cultural and political spheres of activity in the management of 
ethnic diversity. Second, using qualitative data from interviews in Russia, I examine the 
perceptions of (the majority of) respondents from ethnic institutions of being ‘outside politics’, 
and the practical signi¿ cance of this approach. Third, I highlight the factors that are likely to 
prompt persons belonging to ethnic minorities to adjust to dominant narratives by positioning 
themselves within a ‘culture-only’ framework, as well as explaining the presence of (scarce) 
dissenting voices. 
 In this article I focus on ethnic institutions that are not based on territoriality (that is, 
that do not stem from Russia’s ethno-federalism): national cultural autonomies (NCAs) and 
peoples’ congresses. I use the expression ‘non-territorial autonomy’ (NTA) as an umbrella 
term to designate mechanisms that encompass both NCAs and peoples’ congresses. 1  I also 
take into account how ‘regular’ NGOs promoting minority cultures and communities—which 
have not registered as NCAs or peoples’ congresses—position themselves alongside, and 
interact with, NTA institutions. 
 I use data from semi-structured interviews carried out in six cities of the Russian Federation 
(four of which are in ethnic republics): Moscow, St Petersburg, Saransk (Republic of 
Mordovia), Kazan (Tatarstan), Petrozavodsk (Karelia) and Ufa (Bashkortostan). The interviews 
were held during four periods of ¿ eldwork between June 2015 and June 2016. 2  In total 76 
persons were interviewed, 3  55 men and 22 women. The respondents were mostly from civil 
society—national cultural autonomies (30), peoples’ congresses (13), minority NGOs (22). 
Others were academics (specialists in inter-ethnic relations in Russia) (21), public of¿ cials 
(four) or former public of¿ cials (¿ ve); 4  one person was from a cultural centre (a ‘house of 
nationalities’). 5  Some respondents fell into more than one category. The respondents included 
persons of Tatar (24), Mordovian (eight), Jewish (¿ ve), Ukrainian (¿ ve) and German (three) 
ethnic background. 6  In addition: seven respondents originated from one of the Central Asian 
  1  NTA institutions can be contrasted with territorial autonomy, with reference to the ethnicity-based 
constitutional units of the Russian Federation (in particular, the ethnic republics). To designate NTA (and 
other ethnicity-based) institutions I also use the expressions ‘ethnic institutions’ and ‘minority institutions’. 
  2  15–26 June 2015 (Saransk, Kazan); 21–30 October 2015 (Moscow, St Petersburg); 21–29 April 
(Petrozavodsk, Moscow, St Petersburg); 16–30 May 2016 (Ufa, Kazan, Moscow). 
  3  Of these, 21 respondents were interviewed in Kazan, 17 in Moscow, 12 in Ufa, 11 in St Petersburg, eight 
in Saransk and seven in Petrozavodsk. 
  4  The term ‘public of¿ cial’ designates a civil servant or a representative in an elected body. 
  5  Several other respondents had of¿ ces in (and were thereby af¿ liated to) houses of nationalities. 
  6  In this article I use the expression ‘nationality’ interchangeably with ‘ethnicity’ or ‘ethnic group’. The 
Russian  natsional’nost’ is close to the meaning of ‘ethnicity’ (Shahin  1989 ). I also treat all ethnic groups 
in Russia, with the exception of the Russian majority, as national minorities, in line with the usage of the 
expression in international law. See for example the Council of Europe’s 1995 Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities (FCNM), and the Opinions of the Advisory Committee on the FCNM. The 
FCNM was rati¿ ed by Russia in 1998. 
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countries; eight had a Finno-Ugric ethnic background (other than Mordovian), of whom two 
were Karelians; ten were ethnic Russians or did not identify with a particular ethnic group; 
six belonged to other ethnic groups. 7  
 Politics and culture: incompatible opposites? 
 The separation between ethnic institutions’ political and cultural spheres of activity in diversity 
management mirrors the distinction between political and cultural forms of self-determination 
and nation-building. In the study of the nation and nationalism, the modernist paradigm has 
emphasised the political nature of nations, conceived as ‘territorial political communities’. 
Some authors have stressed the primacy of the political over the cultural nation; for example, 
Breuilly ( 1993 ) argues that the latter realises itself through the former, the nation being situated 
within a political context; 8  Deutsch ( 1966 ) and Tilly ( 1975 ) stress that a modern state needs a 
political community, and an identity based on it, in order to be viable; others have seen cultural 
ties as phenomena that shape the nation-state’s political community (Giddens  1985 ), yet 
without acknowledging how nationalism ‘de¿ nes and infuses with passion’ national identities 
(Smith  1998 , p. 75). Inversely, other authors have stressed the strength of cultural nationalism 
(Hutchinson  1987 ,  1994 ,  1999 ; Gans  2003 ). Extreme, diametrically opposed approaches to 
nationalism tend to be uncommon: thus, for example, Smith ( 1998 ) has argued against the 
reductionist portrayal of a nation as an exclusively political community. Similarly, this article 
subscribes to the view that the cultural dimension of a nation does not manifest itself in a 
vacuum and cannot insulate itself from political institutions and processes. 
 The cultural/political divide with reference to inter-ethnic relations within a state was also 
at the heart of the theory of ‘national cultural autonomy’, developed in the late nineteenth 
century by Austro-Marxists Karl Renner ( 2005 ) and Otto Bauer ( 2000 ). With the Austro–
Hungarian empire in mind, the Austro-Marxists posited that the relationship between nations 
and states had to be reconceptualised in order to accommodate the former through cultural 
autonomy. In Renner’s view, the nation had to be disassociated from territory, with a shift 
from the territorial principle to the personality principle: this would enable individuals to 
enjoy cultural autonomy and be part of a nation, regardless of place of residence or territorial 
boundaries (Renner  2005 ). He further envisaged nations as autonomously determining their 
own cultural policies within the overarching political entity of the state: this implied a division 
between cultural matters (issues concerning the nation itself, and managed by it) and political 
issues (‘common affairs’ for all nations, managed by the state) (Renner  2005 , p. 24). Indeed, 
Renner argued, the national question could only be resolved by focusing on the nations 
themselves, and freeing them from ‘political constellations, from the necessity of political 
barter, from feudal and clerical inÀ uences’ (Renner  2005 , p. 31). 
 Lenin’s views diverged from the Austro-Marxists’ approach: while the latter implicitly 
treated cultural self-determination as suf¿ cient to satisfy the needs of nations, Lenin considered 
political self-determination to be superior to its cultural counterpart: the highest form of 
freedom was to be found in the right to secession, particularly as an expression of an ‘oppressed-
nation’ form of nationalism. 9  Questions as to modalities of diversity management—and as to 
  7  Two Azerbaijanis, one Armenian, one Kumyk, one Chechen, one Lithuanian. 
  8  Even while acknowledging that ‘people do yearn for communal membership, do have a strong sense of 
… belonging to culturally de¿ ned and bounded worlds which give their lives meaning’ (Breuilly  1993 , p. 401). 
  9  In opposition to Great Russian nationalism, Lenin’s view was that acknowledging the right to secession 
would not result in the disintegration of the polity, but rather satisfy a quest for equal rights (Lenin  1972 ). 
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whether to place a greater emphasis on political or cultural mechanisms—became prominent 
after 1905, the result of an upsurge of national movements and the formation of nationality-
based political parties (Hirsch  2005 , pp. 24–5). 10  Some such parties called for national-
territorial (political) autonomy, while others (particularly the Jewish Socialist Party, the 
Bund) favoured cultural, extraterritorial autonomy (Bottomore & Goode  1978 ; Pipes  1997 , 
pp. 19, 24, 27–8; Hirsch  2005 ). Following a short-lived experimentation with national cultural 
autonomy in Siberia and the Far East 11  after the revolution—and before the Bolsheviks’ 
ultimate takeover—the Soviet doctrine opted for the territorialisation of ethnicity in the shape 
of ethnic federalism. 12  Yet territoriality was not the only mechanism for diversity management: 
Brubaker ( 1994 , p. 47) highlights the interplay of two different forms of ‘institutionalisation 
of nationhood’: the ‘territorial and political’ (ethnic federalism), and the ‘ethnocultural and 
personal’ (a person’s ethnicity, as recorded in passports, regardless of place of residence). The 
‘ethnocultural and personal’ form of nationhood presented some similarities to the Austro-
Marxists’ personality principle. 13  And, despite the initial emphasis on territorial-political 
self-determination, education and cultural development became vital elements of the Soviet 
strategy in the management of ethnic diversity. 
 The principal reason for the attention to ‘cultural development’ of peoples was practical: 
the Soviet government needed specialised workers and managers for the ef¿ cient running 
of the country. In 1917 Russia had still not produced an industrial proletariat that could 
promote the principles underpinning the revolution, as most of Tsarist Russia’s population 
had resided in rural, underdeveloped regions. Moreover, different ethno-linguistic groups 
were at varying levels of social, economic and political development, so that the success of 
the Soviet project was linked to less developed groups overcoming their backward conditions 
by undergoing a ‘cultural revolution’. 14  Thus, ‘cultural development’ became intertwined 
with modernisation and the advancement of revolutionary (Soviet) principles. 15  As part of 
the population’s development, considerable efforts were made towards the standardisation 
and promotion of minority languages and cultures (Lewis  1972 ; Anderson & Silver  1984 ; 
Kirkwood  1989 ; Martin  2001 ; Grenoble  2003 ; Pavlenko  2008 ), as well as the incorporation 
of ethnic cadres into the Soviet administration ( korenizatsiya ). An interpenetration of culture 
and politico-ideological aims soon emerged, with the Soviet regime making use of ‘cultural 
technologies’ (Hirsch  2005 , p. 13) to propagate particular views, turning culture into an 
‘ideological tool’ (Adams  1998 , p. 96). 16  Thus, ethnographic museums served to promote 
the narrative of the Soviet Union’s transformation (and the development of its peoples) 
under the guidance of the CPSU (Hirsch  2005 , pp. 188–89), with propaganda aimed to 
  12  The Bolsheviks opposed extraterritorial autonomy as liable to divide the proletariat along ethnic lines 
(Stalin  1950 ; Pipes  1997 , p. 33). The territorialisation of ethnicity is further evidenced by Stalin’s de¿ nition 
of a ‘nation’, as a ‘historically evolved, stable community based on a common language,  territory , economic 
life and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture’ (Stalin  1950 , p. 239; emphasis added). 
  13  Although the Bolsheviks clearly had very different priorities, linked to the creation of a Soviet society. 
  14  As it became known in the 1930s (Hirsch  2005 , p. 262). 
  15  By rushing the population through the historical stages of the Marxist timeline: from feudalism to 
capitalism to socialism and, ultimately, to communism. 
  16  See also Verdery ( 1991 ). 
  10  Some ultimately attained representation in the  Duma ; others were active in exile (Pipes  1997 ; Hirsch 
 2005 , p. 25). 
  11  In Siberia (1917–1920, particularly the National Cultural Autonomy of Muslims of Inner Russia and 
Siberia), and the Far East Republic (1920–1922). See Barbieri ( 2011 ), Nam ( 1998 ,  1999 ). 
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alter mass consciousness (Kenez  1985 ). 17  A number of consequences are relevant to this 
article. The ¿ rst is a resulting overlap of cultural and political indoctrination, evident from 
programmes for ‘political education’ ( politprosvet ). 18  Second, the ethno-linguistic complexity 
of the Soviet Union created a need for systematising and classifying its peoples, cultures and 
languages (Tishkov  1997 ). National markers (such as clothing and artefacts for museums, 
dance and music) were identi¿ ed so as to differentiate particular ethnic regions from others 
and to avoid an excessive homogenisation into a Soviet mould (Hirsch  2005 , p. 225). Yet the 
emphasis on particular national (predominantly folklore-based) markers tended to essentialise 
groups, over-simplifying their actual complexity. Third, for the evolution towards a socialist 
society to be presented as successful, ethnographers did not only study cultures but at times 
became involved in processes of cultural production itself, reworking some cultural forms 
subsequently presented as original (Hirsch  2005 , pp. 267–69). It led to a state control of 
culture, to the detriment of spontaneity in cultural expression (Adams  2010 ). 
 The support for national languages and cultures was reduced from the 1930s onwards, 
while the Russian language gained strength as the  de facto of¿ cial language of the Soviet 
Union. Thus, the overarching ‘Soviet culture’ became increasingly homogenising, as well 
as forming a continuum with (Soviet) politics. And, despite the early references to political 
self-determination mentioned above, nationalities and ethnicity-based regions were clearly not 
autonomous political actors: they operated within a rigid socio-political framework supplied 
by the state, which is aptly captured by the well-known Soviet slogan ‘national in form, 
socialist in content’ (Stalin  1955 ). Thus, both culture and political ‘autonomy’ effectively 
converged in the Soviet idea, and the attributes of ‘differences’ between nationalities were 
controlled and only permitted super¿ cial expression. 
 Post-Soviet Russia: the legacy of ‘cultural development’ 
 While ethnicity-based territorial units had not enjoyed real autonomy from the centre in 
the Soviet period, the national renaissance of the 1990s 19  —which had already started under 
 perestroika— raised concerns as to the viability of the newly formed Russian Federation. 
Fears over Russia’s potential dismemberment through multiple claims of territorial autonomy 
led to the notion of non-territorial cultural autonomy becoming an attractive option. 20  The 
formulation of strategies promoting state cohesion was even more urgent given the political 
and economic instability of the Yel’tsin years, and the increasing autonomy of the regions, 21  
particularly non-Russian ones. 
  17  This included repressing forms of ‘backwardness’ and superstition. 
  18  The expression can also be rendered in English as ‘political enlightenment’. 
  19  Clearly various developments also occurred between the 1930s and 1991, which cannot be analysed 
in this article because of space constraints. For changes in the education system during the Soviet period 
affecting minority languages, with the increasingly central role of the Russian language, see Kreindler ( 1989 ), 
Pavlenko ( 2008 ). 
  20  In the summer of 1992 the State Committee for Nationality Affairs developed the ‘Concept of Nationality 
Policy in the Russian Federation’. Although this document did not ultimately gain of¿ cial approval, it contains 
the essence of the shift in nationalities policy, ‘from national- territorial to the national- cultural principle of 
organisations of social life’ (Osipov  2004 , p. 67; emphasis added). 
  21  See, for example, Stoner-Weiss ( 1999 ), Kirkow ( 1998 ). In 1990 and 1991 most of the republics of the 
RSFSR declared their sovereignty, in a phenomenon known as the ‘parade of sovereignties’. 
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 Russia adopted a Law on National Cultural Autonomy (NCA Law) in 1996. 22  The 
introduction of cultural autonomy implied a partial decoupling of ethnicity and territory. 23  
Yet the introduction of NCA also signi¿ ed a stronger focus on cultural, rather than political, 
processes in the management of ethnic diversity. Russia distanced itself from the idea of 
territorial political communities, 24  shifting from the ‘territorial and political’ to (a greater 
emphasis on) the ‘ethnocultural and personal’ form of nationhood, to use Brubaker’s ( 1994 ) 
expressions. 
 Article 1 of the NCA Law de¿ nes NCA as:
 [A] form of national and  cultural self - determination constituting a public association of citizens 
of the Russian Federation, identifying with a particular ethnic community, ¿ nding themselves in a 
situation of national minority in a particular territory, based on their voluntary chosen identity for 
the purpose of  independently regulating the issues of their identity preservation and their linguistic, 
educational and national cultural development. 25  (Emphasis added) 
According to this provision, NCAs can autonomously manage matters relating to an ethnic 
group’s language and culture, including in the area of education. Since 1996, multiple NCAs 
have been established, forming a hierarchy of vertically integrated institutions at the local, 
regional and federal levels. The resulting multilayered structure, developed from the bottom 
up, was to streamline exchanges between ethnic institutions and the authorities. NCAs are not 
the only NTA institutions present in Russia: ‘peoples’ congresses’ have also operated alongside 
(and at times jointly with) NCAs. 26  Peoples’ congresses are ethnicity-based representative 
assemblies that ¿ rst developed in the early twentieth century and re-emerged in the late 
1980s and early 1990s (Osipov  2011 , p. 4). Resolutions are agreed upon during regular 
congresses, with the participation of delegates from regional organisations; thus, like NCAs, 
peoples’ congresses have a pyramidal structure. 27  For example, Tatarstan houses the World 
Congress of Tatars, which brings together Tatar organisations in Russia, and also convenes 
international events for co-ethnics outside Russia. Peoples’ congresses in the other republics 
visited during the ¿ eldwork were: the Inter-Regional Public Organisation of Mordovian 
(Moksha and Erzya) Peoples, the Congress of Karelians and the World Kurultaj (Congress) 
  25  Federal’nyi zakon 74-FZ, ‘O natsional’no-kul’turnoi avtonomii’, 17 June 1996. By 2016 the 
law had been amended ten times. The text of the law (in Russian) and amendments are available at: 
 http://base.garant.ru/135765/ , accessed 17 March 2017. 
  26  In some cases there is a convergence of the two structures, for example with Mordovian NCAs at the 
local level being part of the network of the Mordovian people’s congress. 
  27  Peoples’ congresses are included in this article given that they present some of the features of non-territorial 
cultural autonomy: they promote the interests of a particular ethnicity, they have a representative structure 
(based on internal elections), and they are generally in receipt of public funds. See Osipov ( 2011 , pp. 4–5). 
  22  Federal’nyi zakon 74-FZ, ‘O natsional’no-kul’turnoi avtonomii’, 17 June 1996. By 2016 the 
law had been amended ten times. The text of the law (in Russian) and amendments are available at: 
 http://base.garant.ru/135765/ , accessed 17 March 2017. Russia is not the only Eastern European country to 
have adopted legal provisions on NCA in the post-communist period; other examples include Estonia, Hungary 
and Serbia. 
  23  Only ‘partial’ as the Federation’s ethnic republics were preserved. Indeed, titular nationalities were unlikely 
to renounce territorial arrangements, which would have been seen as a retrogressive step in the promotion 
of their rights (Oversloot  2007 ,  2013 ; Hagendoom  et al .  2008 ). Non-territorial cultural autonomy was thus 
combined with territoriality. 
  24  As per Stalin’s de¿ nition of a nation (Stalin  1950 , p. 239). 
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of Bashkirs. 28  The main difference between NCAs and peoples’ congresses is that NCAs are 
registered according to a  lex specialis (the NCA Law) and, by the same law, they must operate 
outside a particular group’s ethnic republic (if it exists); by contrast, peoples’ congresses are 
registered as ‘ordinary’ public organisations 29  and can operate both inside and outside the 
relevant ethnicity-based territorial formations. 
 Russia’s approach to diversity management is far removed from mechanisms that directly 
involve national minorities in the political life of the country, such as consociational power-
sharing systems. 30  The creation of new territorial-political formations granting regional 
autonomy to ethnic communities residing therein might have led to more tangible options 
for inÀ uencing decision-making at the regional level, and for minority participation in public 
life. The Russian system also differs from institutional designs that guarantee or facilitate 
representation of national minorities in parliament, through reserved seats and/or ethnicity-
based political parties. Yet even within the cultural sphere, cultural autonomy has ultimately 
been denuded of many of its attributes, metamorphosing into general rights to ‘culture’ and 
‘development’ without these being accompanied by speci¿ c bene¿ ts for minorities or detailed 
government obligations. 31  Legislation on ‘development’ of minority languages and cultures 
is declarative, and devoid of mechanisms for implementation (Bowring  2013 , p: 33; Oeter 
 2013 , p. 43). 32  Similarly, Osipov ( 2013b , p. 67) argues that references to ‘cultural and national 
development’ 33  are empty of meaning in practice, despite frequently occurring in public 
discourse and of¿ cial documents on inter-ethnic relations. ‘Cultural autonomy’ does not extend 
to the autonomous management of cultural and educational matters and institutions (such as 
minority-language schools). NCAs have primarily (albeit not exclusively) been involved in 
a range of cultural activities, particularly (inter-)ethnic festivals, seminars and other public 
events. In this sense the Soviet legacy of strongly associating ethnic institutions with cultural 
(often folklore-based) activities has been prolonged and continuously revived. 
 Ethnic institutions ‘outside politics’? 
 In this context NTA institutions appear to be situated ‘outside politics’. In order to examine 
to what extent this proposition corresponds to reality I rely on data from interviews, even 
though one should, at this point, note a (seemingly inevitable) selection bias with regard to 
  28  The Mordovian and Karelian congresses are also part of a multi-ethnic (and overarching) network of 
organisations united by ethno-linguistic af¿ nity: the Association of Finno-Ugric Peoples of Russia (AFUN) 
and, at the international level, the World Congress of Finno-Ugric Peoples. 
  29  See Art. 21, Federal’nyi zakon 82-FZ, ‘Ob obshchestvennykh ob”edineniyakh’, 19 May 1995, available at: 
 http://base.garant.ru/10164186/ , accessed 17 March 2017. 
  30  See, for example, Lijphart ( 2008 ) and Taylor ( 2009 ). 
  31  A signi¿ cant difference between Renner’s NCA model and the Russian post-Soviet model is that in 
the latter case funding is not readily available for NCA activity. In Renner’s model, each nationality would 
manage its own education system and cultural outputs (literature and art) through resources provided directly 
by the members of each nationality  via the payment of taxes (Renner  2005 , p. 31). The ¿ nancial resources of 
Russia’s NCAs are generally very limited. 
  32  For example, Art. 2(2) of the Law ‘On the Languages of the Peoples of the Russian Federation’ 
states: ‘The Russian Federation guarantees all its peoples regardless of their numbers equal rights on 
the conservation and  development of the native language, freedom of choice and of use of the language 
for communication’ (emphasis added). The law does not refer to mechanisms for implementation. 
Federal’nyi Zakon 1807-I, ‘O yazykakh narodov Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, 25 October 1991, available at: 
 http://base.garant.ru/10148970/ , accessed 17 March 2017. 
  33  See for example Art. 71(f) of the 1993 Russian Constitution. 
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respondents in this study: the tense relations between Russia and the West, and the state’s 
targeting of Russian organisations with links to foreign institutions 34  have likely had a 
negative impact on the decision of potential respondents as to whether to grant interviews, 
and/or the information they chose to disclose. While a small number of respondents were 
relatively outspoken (mostly academics, but also a few NGO and NTA representatives), 
many—particularly those who cooperated more closely with state organs—seemed to choose 
their wording very carefully, and at times nervously. This was likely exacerbated by the fact 
that, under Putin, the regional devolution of the Yel’tsin years was counteracted by strong 
re-centralising moves, statism and the promotion of Russian patriotism (Laruelle  2009a , 
 2009b ; Prina  2016 ), as well as severe limitations on civil society freedom. 35  
 The ¿ rst notable point concerning the place of NTA institutions in Russian society is that 
respondents from these organisations tended to stress in interviews that they operated ‘outside 
politics’. 36  They referred to the ‘apolitical’ nature of their organisations when answering 
general questions concerning their activities and objectives. At the same time, some of the 
respondents also held seats in elected bodies (for example, as MPs in their republic’s  Duma ). 
Others were members of public chambers 37  at the regional or federal levels. In these cases, 
stating that they were ‘outside politics’ might seem disingenuous: they occasionally indicated 
that these positions provided supplementary opportunities to promote the interests of their 
ethnic communities, through direct dialogue with public of¿ cials, some of whom were 
particularly high-ranking in regional or federal state organs. However, these respondents 
did not, overall, explicitly refer to the use of political channels to advance their goals, in the 
sense that they refrained from direct involvement in politics, such as electoral campaigning 
or seeking political representation, or indirect political activity, such as lobbying politicians 
or MPs for legal reform or policy changes, or calling for direct involvement in law-making. 
 One of the reasons for the underuse of such channels is very prosaic: political parties on 
the basis of ethnicity are banned in Russia. 38  Persons belonging to ethnic minorities have 
entered politics—if they have chosen and managed to do so—as members of mainstream 
parties, particularly the party of power, United Russia ( Edinaya Rossiya —UR) (Chaisty 
 2013 ). For example, in September 2016 the Republic of Tatarstan’s  Duma had 82 MPs from 
UR out of a total of 95 MPs. 39  Numerous governors have similarly joined the ranks of UR 
(Reuter  2010 ). Meanwhile, mainstream parties have not included speci¿ c issues of relevance 
  36  The recurring expression was  my vne politiki (‘we are outside politics’). 
  37  Public chambers are institutions established to facilitate consultation between the state and civil society, 
at the federal and regional levels. For the federal-level public chamber, see Federal’nyi zakon 32-FZ, ‘Ob 
Obshchestvennoi palate Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, 4 April 2005, available at:  http://www.consultant.ru/document/
cons_doc_LAW_52651/ , accessed 17 March 2017. 
  38  The constitutionality of this restriction was con¿ rmed by the Russian Constitutional Court (Judgement 
No. 18-P, 15 December 2004) on the grounds that ethnic parties could exacerbate ethnic or religious 
tensions. On the Council of Europe’s criticism of the ban, see Advisory Committee on the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (ACFC),  (Third) Opinion on the Russian Federation , 
ACFC/OP/III(2011)010, 24 November 2011, §26, 136, 140, 206, 267, available at:  https://rm.coe.int/
CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId==090000168008c6a6 , accessed 
17 March 2017. 
  39  The other MPs were af¿ liated to ‘Tatarstan—New Age’ (ten MPs) and the Communist Party (three). 
See the website of the government of Tatarstan, available at:  http://gossov.tatarstan.ru/frakcii/ , accessed 7 
September 2016. 
  34  Through the ‘Foreign Agents’ Law. See below (‘Crimes’ and punishment). 
  35  See below (‘Crimes’ and punishment). 
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to minority groups in their political platforms in order to attract ethnic votes (Moser  2000 , 
p. 83). 40  And, as Giuliano and Gorenburg ( 2012 ) point out, ethnicity only played a role in 
Russian politics during a brief period of ethnic revival in the 1990s, after which it faded. 41  
Before highlighting factors for NTA institutions’ underuse of political processes to promote 
ethnicity-related interests, we need to account for the respondents’ perceptions of ‘politics’. 
 What kind of ‘politics’? 
 ‘Politics’, ‘political processes’ and ‘political activity’ are clearly multifaceted expressions, 
open to multiple interpretations. As for other policy areas, the Russian leadership might have 
chosen to leave them ‘purposefully ambiguous’. 42  The concept of ‘political activity’ can stretch 
to encompass various acts, which may or may not be directly in opposition to the Russian 
government but still be regarded as deviating from existing rules of engagement and, as such, 
contained, as shown below. Similarly, various perceptions of ‘politics’ were detected among 
the respondents. For example, the head of a regional German NCA noted that remaining 
outside politics was not a realistic option for Russian Germans, in light of the history of their 
deportation from the Volga region. 43  In his opinion, the Russian Germans had had no choice 
but to confront this particular political issue. 44  At the same time, another leader of the same 
NCA structure (in a higher-ranking position), while also referring to the Russian Germans’ 
painful past, did not consider it an issue of a political nature. 45  Besides the speci¿ city of the 
Russian Germans’ case, divergent perceptions of politics can be partially attributed to the 
fact that the word  politika in Russian can be translated as either ‘politics’ or ‘policy’ (as in 
 natsional’naya politika— ethnic politics/policies). One of the interview questions was whether 
NTA institutions could impact upon Russia’s  natsional’naya politika . Some respondents 
evidently interpreted the question as to whether their activities related to political processes 
and institutions. In this case, the respondents almost invariably replied that involvement 
in activities perceived as ‘political’ or decision-making on broadly de¿ ned political issues 
were outside the remit of public organisations. Often there was no expectation that ethnic 
institutions would become involved in decision-making: for example, a representative of the 
Moscow branch of the Mordovian people’s congress—the Inter-Regional Public Organisation 
of Mordovian (Moksha and Erzya) Peoples (hereinafter ‘Mordovian people’s congress’)—said 
that it was not for an organisation such as his to take decisions on documents such as the 
‘Strategy of State Nationality Policy of the Russian Federation until 2025’: this was for the 
experts and the politicians, while his institution’s role was to promote Mordovian culture. 46  
  40  See also Moser ( 2013 ). 
  41  It has also been argued that ethnicity has played a role in Russian electoral politics, as United Russia has 
relied on the support of ethnic regions, including (but not only—White  2016 ) through electoral manipulation 
(Goodnow  et al .  2014 ), although results have been inÀ uenced by regional contextual characteristics (White 
 2015 ). 
  42  The expression is Shevel’s ( 2011 ), with reference to ‘compatriots’ in Russian legislation. 
  43  Ethnic Germans who migrated to Russia in the eighteenth century and settled in the Volga region were 
treated as Nazi collaborators during World War II. The Volga German Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, 
which had been established in 1924, was abolished in 1941 and ethnic Germans deported to Siberia and 
Central Asia. 
  44  Interview 1.1, with a German NCA representative, Kazan, 21 May 2016 (see the Appendix for the list 
of cited respondents). 
  45  Interview 1.2, with a German NCA representative, Moscow, 27 May 2016. 
  46  Interview 2.1, with a Mordovian people’s congress representative, Moscow, 20 October 2015. 
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These respondents did not refer to a possible nexus between the promotion of a minority 
culture and the formulation of policies conducive to it through an inclusive process. Other 
respondents interpreted the same question on impact on ethnic policies as inquiring over 
possible cooperation between ethnic institutions and the authorities in formulating (federal 
or regional) inter-ethnic policies or strategies. In this case, the respondents generally referred 
to opportunities for dialogue with state organs. 47  
 Overall, NTA activities have tended to revolve around the preservation of non-Russian 
cultures and languages. 48  In line with this, when asked about possible problems faced by their 
communities, most respondents referred to ongoing processes leading to the loss of their 
cultures and languages, which called for countervailing measures. Similarly, when asked about 
their motivation for establishing NTA institutions, they primarily talked about the promotion 
of their languages and cultures. 49  In describing cooperation with governmental institutions, 
the respondents principally mentioned participation in cultural and educational events. 
 At the same time, there were additional dimensions to the activity of NTA institutions. 
And, to be sure, some differences are to be attributed to varying circumstances relating to 
individuals and their organisations: even in the relatively small sample of persons interviewed, 
there were substantial variations in factors such as profession, age, levels of education of 
persons involved with NTA institutions, as well as their motivation for civic engagement. Some 
respondents referred to activities that were not strictly culture-related, such as monitoring the 
implementation of relevant law and policy. One such example was provided in Mordovia, 
with reference to the implementation of the obligation to teach the two Mordovian languages 
(Moksha and Erzya) in schools. 50  The respondent, a representative of the Mordovian people’s 
congress, argued that public of¿ cials, given their limited time and resources, could not 
assess the impact and possible shortcomings of multilingual education: in these cases, civil 
society organisations provide the relevant data, which could be employed to rectify possible 
de¿ ciencies, through mutually bene¿ cial cooperation. 51  Others referred to activities resulting 
in tangible outputs, such as textbooks for language education. 52  Moreover, some NCAs 
provided a support network to co-ethnics, particularly immigrants recently arrived in Russia, 53  
or carried out other social and humanitarian functions to help their communities. 54  According 
  49  The other motivating factor frequently cited by respondents was what they perceived to be the ‘higher 
status’ that NCAs possess in the eyes of the authorities, compared to other civil society organisations. 
  50  This is also mentioned in the Resolution of the 6th Congress (with reference to the Republic of Mordovia 
and areas—outside the republic—densely populated by Mordovians) (see above on the Resolution). 
  51  Interview 2.2, with a Mordovian people’s congress representative, Saransk, 18 June 2015. 
  52  Interview 1.4, with representatives of a Tatar NCA, Kazan, 24 June 2015; interview 1.12, with a Finnish 
NCA, St Petersburg, 26 October 2015. 
  53  Interviews with representatives of the following: 1.3, an Azerbaijani NCA, Moscow, 23 October 2015; 
1.5, an Azerbaijani NCA, St Petersburg, 28 October 2015; 1.6, an Armenian NCA, Kazan, 20 May 2016; 1.7, 
a Tajik NCA, Kazan, 18 May 2016; and 1.8, an Uzbek NCA, Kazan, 17 May 2016. 
  54  Interview 1.9, with a Jewish NCA, Petrozavodsk, 25 April 2016; interview 1.10, with a Lithuanian NCA, 
Petrozavodsk, 25 April 2016. The NTA institutions referred to here are only part of the constellation of the 
civil society institutions that are active in the promotion of minority rights, languages and cultures; according 
to an academic interviewed, some NGOs might be more effective than NTA institutions in providing practical 
assistance to persons belonging to minorities—for example, in the case of assistance to migrants. Interview 
4.3, with an academic specialising in inter-ethnic relations in Russia, Moscow, 22 October 2015. 
  47  Although there were some exceptions, described below (‘Crimes’ and punishment; The implications of 
remaining ‘outside politics’). 
  48  See these organisations’ aims, as outlined in their statutes; for example, the website of the Mordovian 
people’s congress (available at:  http://mordvarf.com/ , accessed 7 September 2016), and the Resolution from 
the 6th Congress (available at:  http://mordvarf.com/rezoljucija-vi-sjezda/ , accessed 7 September 2016). 
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to an observer (an academic in St Petersburg), 55  they further provided something akin to a clan 
structure, in the case of groups relying on such social networks. At times NTA institutions found 
themselves mediating between co-ethnics and Russian of¿ cials, contributing to the pre-emption 
of inter-ethnic tensions. For example, the leader of the local NCA related two instances in which 
persons belonging to her ethnic group had been apprehended by the police for irregularities: 
in both cases she had received phone calls from the police and was asked to make herself 
available to discuss, and ¿ nd a solution, to the problem with all parties involved. 56  Similarly, 
other respondents referred to occasions in which they were summoned to ‘resolve’ a problem 
that involved ethnic minorities, so as to defuse existing or potential inter-ethnic tensions. 57  
 Another activity mentioned by some respondents was participation in devising documents 
on nationalities policy. For example, one respondent said that the Mordovian people’s congress 
had submitted recommendations to a draft of the ‘Strategy of State Nationality Policy of 
the Russian Federation until 2025’. In his opinion, these had been taken into account by the 
Russian government. 58  Another respondent talked about opportunities to contribute to strategy 
documents on immigration. 59  NTA institutions have also made reference in their resolutions to 
involvement in the formulation of law and policy, as well as their execution. For example, the 
resolution from the 6th congress of the Mordovian people includes as objectives: ‘to introduce 
in the regions the practice of preliminary discussions of draft legislation … concerning inter-
ethnic relations, in cooperation with representatives of national public organisations’; and 
‘to appeal to the state organs of the subjects of the Russian Federation, in regions where 
Mordovians live compactly, with the request to guarantee the adequate representation of 
Mordovians in elected organs and their representatives’ participation in the work of the 
executive organs at various levels, and in the activities of the public chamber’. 60  
 In practice the activities of NCAs and peoples’ congresses have mostly been inward-
looking: their organisational events have been primarily geared to preparing resolutions on 
their proposed aims and programmes of activity, while they do not seem to inÀ uence or inform 
public policy on Russia’s multi-ethnicity. In line with this, a leader of the Tatar regional NCA 
of Bashkortostan (also an MP) stated that, in the republic’s  Duma , Tatar representatives did 
not raise issues speci¿ cally relating to their ethnic community, but to the entire population 
of Bashkortostan, implying that the republic’s parliament was ethnicity-blind. 61  This position 
indicates an avoidance of the articulation of possible group interests, as well as a lack of 
civic activism beyond mainstream (political) processes. Thus, despite some variation in 
perceptions and type of activities—for some exclusively focusing on culture, for others 
partially involving policy (with some consultation and opportunity to inÀ uence policy-making) 
and/or ‘humanitarian’ (neither cultural, nor political) functions—overall, the respondents for 
the most part located NTA institutions outside political processes. 
  55  Interview 4.1, with an academic, St Petersburg, 30 October 2015. 
  56  Interview 1.10, with a Lithuanian NCA representative, Petrozavodsk, 25 April 2016. 
  57  Interview 1.7, with a Tajik NCA representative, Kazan, 18 May 2016; interview 1.8, with an Uzbek NCA 
representative, Kazan, 17 May 2016. 
  58  Interview 2.3, with a Mordovian people’s congress representative, Saransk, 19 June 2015. Another 
Mordovian respondent considered this beyond the remit of the Mordovian people’s congress. Interview 2.1, 
with a Mordovian people’s congress representative, Moscow, 20 October 2015 (see above, same section). 
  59  Interview 1.3, with an Azerbaijani NCA representative, Moscow, 23 October 2015. However, these 
documents tend to be general. See below (The limitations of formal processes and systems). 
  60  On public chambers, see above. 
  61  Interview 1.11, with a Tatar NCA representative, Ufa, 23 May 2016. 
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 Why remain ‘outside politics’? 
 What the respondents really think is not accessible to the researcher: their statements as to 
their preference to steer away from politics might simply relate to the public persona they 
wish to project. Yet, for those who have chosen to embrace the system, what could account 
for the choice of an ‘apolitical’, culture-only approach? 
 The importance of culture: identity and recognition 
 Most respondents pointed to a close nexus between ethnicity and identity: they considered the 
preservation and celebration of one’s culture and resisting the danger of forgetting one’s origins 
to be crucial to one’s identity and personal ful¿ lment. An anecdote provides useful insight: 
when chatting to a respondent before an interview I mentioned that the language of the region 
where I grew up was disappearing, but that I was not active in promoting its preservation, 
while I researched issues linked to minority cultures and languages in Russia. He described 
my condition as that of a ‘shoemaker without shoes’: 62  the respondent found incomprehensible 
my decision to place academic curiosity before my own identity. His approach also pointed 
to an appreciation of culture  per se , in its ‘pure’ forms, devoid of a political dimension. In 
line with this, an NCA leader stated that the pursuit of political interests was incompatible 
with the role of leader of an ethnic community: political ambitions could interfere with the 
promotion of minority cultures, which would become instrumentalised as political capital. 63  
 A second reason for the predilection of a ‘culture-only’ framework seems to derive from 
cognitive frames constructed around dominant narratives stemming from Soviet legacies. 
Festivals have been the main instruments to channel and express ethnic identity, and such practices 
remain deeply entrenched. Similarly, in her analysis of cultural production in Uzbekistan, Adams 
( 1998 ,  2010 ) refers to Soviet ‘cultural schemas’, arguing that they continue to inÀ uence cultural 
production in post-Soviet societies. 64  In line with this interpretation, NTA organisations’ activities 
have often focused on cultural production (particularly through ethnic festivals). This tends to 
take place, as in the Soviet period, through the standardisation and classi¿ cation of cultures, with 
events divided into ‘slots’ for different ethnic groups (Adams  1998 , p. 99;  2010 ). Meanwhile, the 
Russian government, through a centralised education system and media, maintains a monopoly 
on meanings of cultural production and symbols, 65  for both majority and minority identities, and 
how these interact with each other: the diversity of ethnic groups is located within the unifying 
framework of Russian patriotism. 66  In this context, the Russian government continues to promote 
an idealised discourse around the Soviet narrative of friendship of peoples ( druzhba narodov ) 
and inter-ethnic accord, which coexists with Russia’s multi-ethnicity. 67  
  62  He used the expression  sapozhnik bez sapog. 
  63  Interview 1.2, with a German NCA representative, Moscow, 27 May 2016. 
  64  Adams draws on DiMaggio ( 1997 ) and Sewell ( 1992 )’s work, interpreting schemas as ‘both representation 
of knowledge and information processing mechanisms … which are applied in the enactment and reproduction 
of social life’ (Adams  1998 , p. 94). She analyses schemas with reference to the way people think about and 
produce culture. 
  65  See also Prina ( 2016 , pp. 95–153). On the promotion of these narratives in the media, see Hutchings 
and Tolz ( 2015 ). 
  66  On Russian patriotism, see Laruelle ( 2009a , p. 5) and Daucé  et al . ( 2010 ). For an account of recent 
developments in Russian nationalism, see Kolstø and Blakkisrud ( 2016 ). 
  67  Concepts linked to inter-ethnic tolerance were referred to by many respondents, who stressed the 
importance of inter-ethnic festivals. 
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 In steering away from political processes and valuing culture as a vehicle to express 
and assert their identity, some respondents displayed what seemed to be a genuine lack of 
interest in politics or even policy-making. This reÀ ected the perception of cultural autonomy 
institutions primarily as cultural centres, 68  and is close to Soviet forms of expression of ethnic 
identity through culture. For example, the leader of a Ukrainian NCA in an ethnic republic 
stated that her motivation for establishing the organisation was a strong emotional attachment 
to Ukraine and Ukrainian culture: the NCA was a way of retaining a connection with her 
country of origin, celebrating it through festivals and music. 69  Like other respondents, she did 
not convey a particular interest in dialogue with the authorities. Others noted that their priority 
was the inter-generational transmission of their language: 70  in these cases engagement with 
the authorities and heading an NCA was not seen as leading to signi¿ cant bene¿ ts, but rather 
to dissipating already scarce resources, particularly given the administrative responsibilities 
arising from the management of an NCA. 71  
 The leader of a minority NGO referred to other dimensions of cultural activities: he 
believed that festivals and traditional songs had a deep emotional value for members of his 
community. This was particularly so, he believed, for the elderly, who, in the case of his ethnic 
group, had had limited freedom to express their identity in this fashion during the Soviet 
period. 72  His organisation did not wish to disappoint their members by failing to represent the 
community at inter-ethnic festivals, which would deprive them of an outlet for the expression 
of their cultural distinctiveness, through various manifestations of group identity (music and 
dancing with a folk ensemble, souvenirs and handicrafts, traditional food). Yet the respondent 
also referred to the practical dif¿ culties of these types of cultural activities: the need to organise 
the transport of members of ensembles and musical instruments to the festival area, despite 
already overstretched resources, as well as an ‘obligation … to smile for the cameras’. In this 
context, he indicated that, overall, he found these events super¿ cial and overly rigid, con¿ ned 
to repetitive and standardised forms of expression. 73  His opinion was rare; the majority of 
respondents expressed acquiescence and/or consensus with reference to existing practices. 
 Consensus might result from the already mentioned predominance of Soviet legacies 
and continuity through a form of ‘institutional inertia’ (Adams  1998 , p. 101). In line with 
the approach of new institutionalists, this form of behaviour might reproduce itself because 
‘individuals often cannot even conceive of appropriate alternatives (or because they regard as 
unrealistic the alternatives they can imagine)’ (Powell & DiMaggio  1991 , p. 11). It has also 
been suggested that such acquiescence might make persons belonging to minorities effectively 
complicit in perpetuating a condition of ‘falsehood’. Osipov ( 2010 ,  2012 ) describes Russia’s 
law and policy on minority rights as symbolic rather than instrumental, 74  while also linking 
participants in these processes as effectively endorsing ‘the disciplinary techniques embedded 
  68  This view is much removed from the original idea of cultural autonomy conceived by the Austro-Marxists 
(of which the respondents seemed generally unaware). 
  69  Interview 1.15, with a Ukrainian NCA representative, Saransk, 17 June 2015. 
  70  Interview 1.12, with a Finnish NCA representative in St Petersburg, 26 October 2015; interview 3.4, with 
the representative of a (Finno-Ugric) ethnicity-based NGO, St Petersburg, 28 October 2015. 
  71  Interview 1.12, with a Finnish NCA representative in St Petersburg, 26 October 2015; interview 3.4, with 
the representative of a (Finno-Ugric) ethnicity-based NGO, St Petersburg, 28 October 2015. 
  72  Interview 3.5, with the representative of a (Finno-Ugric) ethnicity-based NGO, St Petersburg, 27 October 2015. 
  73  Interview 3.5, with the representative of a (Finno-Ugric) ethnicity-based NGO, St Petersburg, 27 October 2015. 
  74  Similarly, Zamyatin ( 2014 ) argues that laws declaring titular languages of republics as co-of¿ cial alongside 
Russian were never intended to be fully implemented, but rather to ful¿ l a symbolic function (Zamyatin  2014 ). 
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in society’, resulting in diversity management resting on ‘a silent agreement between the 
government and the citizenry’ (Osipov  2013a , p. 79). 75  This would imply a scenario in which 
a genuinely pluralistic society is not the aim of diversity management, but rather an illusion 
of it. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has linked the prevalence of 
ethnic festivals to the ‘folklorisation’ of minorities replacing their linguistic and cultural 
rights. This could bring the risk of minorities being ‘relegated to the realm of statistics and 
colourful folklore’, 76  resulting in the expression of a super¿ cial form of ethnic essentialism 
while also marginalising more vital minority concerns. Similarly, the Council of Europe 
referred to a ‘narrow’ interpretation of ‘culture’ in the implementation of the NCA Law, 
which ‘discourages the engagement of national-cultural autonomies with other relevant issues 
related to minority identity’. 77  
 At the same time, symbolic policies can have a highly signi¿ cant function in providing a 
form of self-validation through recognition, akin to that described by Taylor ( 1992 ). Russia’s 
ethnic institutions are afforded attention at a very high level; for example, in 2008 then 
president Dmitry Medvedev participated in the ¿ fth World Congress of Finno-Ugric Peoples; 
in 2013 Putin attended an event celebrating 225 years of the Central Spiritual Administration 
of Russia’s Muslims. 78  Many respondents from NTA institutions appeared to value such 
recognition highly; even those who saw the limitations of Russia’s minority policies were 
appreciative of the fact that local and regional authorities treated minority institutions with 
‘respect’ 79  —another form of recognition. Moreover, the complex, multilayered structures of 
peoples’ congresses and large (particularly federal) NCAs give them an aura of of¿ cialdom and 
social importance. This recognition is even more valued in light of the widespread perception 
of the close nexus between ethnicity and identity already mentioned, and of cultural events 
 per se being treated as invested with social signi¿ cance. 
 It is in the context of the importance attached to culture and its (symbolic or practical) 
recognition that one can also situate the two main types of NTA institutions (NCAs and 
peoples’ congresses), with their complex networks of organisations. The proliferation of 
organisations promoting minority cultures was generally not considered problematic by 
the respondents: it was not underpinned by different ideological (or political) positions, 
but rather the said organisations were united by a shared overarching objective: cultural 
survival in a sea of Russianness, where minority languages and customs are increasingly 
being assimilated into the dominant Russian culture (Prina  2016 ). Any action that could 
publicise and promote a minority culture would contribute to its survival by adding to the 
efforts of individual organisations. At the same time, such convergence was made possible 
by the nature of the organisations’ activities: the promotion of cultures in a general sense (as 
  76  ‘Situation of Finno-Ugric and Samoyed Peoples’, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
(PACE), Doc.11087, 26 October 2006, available at:  http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-
ViewHTML.asp?FileID==11601&lang==EN , accessed 8 November 2016. 
  77  ‘(Third) Opinion on the Russian Federation’, Council of Europe ACFC, ACFC/OP/III(2011)010, 24 November 
2011, §20; see also §26, 74, 136, 211, available at:  https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/
DisplayDCTMContent?documentId==090000168008c6a6 , accessed March 2017. 
  78  See, ‘Medvedev s glavami Finlandii, Vengrii i Estonia otkroet kongress’,  RIA Novosti , 26 June 2008, 
available at:  https://ria.ru/politics/20080628/112448151.html , accessed 8 November 2016; ‘Putin: Islam 
yavlyaetsya yarkim elementom Rossiiskogo kul’turnogo koda’,  RIA Novosti , 22 October 2013, available at: 
 https://ria.ru/society/20131022/971874406.html , accessed 8 November 2016. 
  79  Interview 1.9, with a Jewish NCA representative, Petrozavodsk, 25 April 2016. 
  75  See also Adams ( 2010 , pp. 187–92). 
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‘cultural development’) rather than their work being driven by strategic choices that could 
foreseeably result in targeted policy changes. 80  
 Cooperation and networks: some bene¿ ts 
 There is also a cluster of pragmatic reasons for remaining ‘outside politics’. Some respondents 
indicated that they regarded involvement in politics as counterproductive, as well as a 
(perhaps) ‘unbecoming’ 81  option, which would lead to endless political disputes, complicating 
the relations between the authorities and civil society. It echoes Renner’s view ( 2005 , p. 31) 
that nations should be freed from ‘political barter’. It is also in line with Putin’s efforts to 
create what we may call a ‘post-politics’  milieu , by replacing political actors with managers 
and bureaucrats (Filippov  2004 ). The latter operate at a level that is above what may be 
regarded as petty political battles, while also aligning themselves with the political majority 
and employing channels that are akin to ‘gentlemen’s agreements’. 82  
 It is a form of personalised politics, by which personalities—and informal practices and 
networks, rather than institutions and systems—are principally responsible for the outcomes 
of socio-political processes. This results in a reliance on (neo-)patrimonial links, 83  which have 
allowed individuals and institutions to operate alongside existing (yet unviable) systems: 
informal practices provide alternatives to unpredictable and unreliable legal, political or 
¿ nancial institutions (Ledeneva  1998 ,  2006 ,  2013 ). In line with this, a respondent (an academic 
specialising in inter-ethnic relations), referred to immigration policies by noting ‘naturally, if 
there is not a well-de¿ ned state policy, a shadow mechanism appears instead’. 84  
 Within this framework, informal practices and networks can similarly assist minority 
institutions in furthering their cultural rights. To this must be added the bene¿ ts of the status 
conferred upon NCAs and peoples’ congresses compared to ordinary NGOs, cited by various 
respondents. 85  Respondents did not generally refer to the practical advantages offered by 
NTA institutions, such as precedence in accessing funding, 86  or greater inÀ uence in feeding 
into discussions of consultative bodies. Rather, they referred more to a symbolic status: the 
‘recognition’ mentioned above. Institutional af¿ liation to or leadership of an NCA at the 
regional or—even more signi¿ cantly—the federal level, and the resulting status and networks, 
  80  Outside this framework there also exist more militant organisations, such as the Tatar Public Centre, that 
openly disagree with of¿ cial positions. 
  81  My expression. 
  82  One of the primary reasons has been a shift in the locus of power from the legislative to the executive 
organs under Putin (Chaisty  2006 ; Giuliano & Gorenburg  2012 ). 
  83  Hughes and Sasse ( 2002 , p. 28) refer to the ‘personalization of the bargaining processes’ in Russian 
society; see also Osipov ( 2014 ). 
  84  Interview 4.1, with an academic, St Petersburg, 30 October 2015. The respondent referred to inadequate 
immigration practices, which gave rise to a tendency to illegality, corruption and a shadow economy in relation 
to immigration. 
  85  Interview 1.10, with a Lithuanian NCA, Petrozavodsk, 25 April 2016; interview 1.12, with a Finnish 
NCA, St Petersburg, 26 October 2015; interview 1.16, with a Jewish NCA, Saransk, 16 June 2015. 
  86  In practice, the interview data suggest that organisations with good relations with the authorities—and 
particularly NCAs and peoples’ congresses—tend to have more access to public funds, although funding is 
scarce, and often supplemented by income from other sources (members of the community and/or sponsors). 
Funding from foreign sources has been restricted by the ‘Foreign Agents’ Law. See below (‘Crimes’ and 
punishment). 
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seem to have been, in some cases, usefully employed for the promotion of minority languages 
and cultures. In this context, some leaders appeared extremely active and motivated: for 
example, the head of a federal NCA in Moscow referred to a case in which she had used 
the status arising from her leadership position (and possibly from high-ranking contacts) to 
reverse a decision to close minority nurseries used by her community. Her technique, she 
said, had amounted to phoning the right people and emphatically putting her point across. 87  
Other examples given by the respondents were: the reconsideration of cases of (arbitrary or 
disputed) detention of persons belonging to national minorities; the use of particular textbooks 
or publications in schools, at the local or regional level; minor alterations to documents on 
strategies on inter-ethnic relations, on the basis of stakeholder recommendations. Many such 
cases seemed to have involved informal mediation of leaders of minority groups with state 
representatives. In such cases, the status deriving from NTA-related positions has only a 
tenuous link to systems leading to decision- or policy-making in the cultural sphere, yet some 
minority leaders can make use of their networks to inÀ uence such processes through informal 
practices, operating at the periphery of political processes. Some ethnic leaders have contacts 
with high-ranking state of¿ cials, including the country’s president and prime minister: thus, 
NTA can provide access to opportunities by creating a fertile ground for cooperation between 
civil society and the authorities at various levels. 
 According to the leader of an NCA, registering an organisation as an NCA acts as guarantee 
for the authorities that it will be ‘playing by the rules’, making public of¿ cials well-disposed 
towards it. 88  An observer (head of a research centre) stressed that NCAs did not wish to oppose 
governmental organs, but rather to optimise opportunities for cooperation. 89  To enable this, 
NTA institutions have tended to support government positions: according to the same NCA 
respondent, minority institutions have been expected to support the slogan ‘ Krym Nash ’ 
(‘Crimea is Ours’), following Russia’s 2014 annexations of Crimea. 90  NTA institutions have 
engaged in other activities that support the government: for example, respondents indicated 
that they cultivated contacts with their kin states’ embassies, facilitating quasi-diplomatic 
links, thereby promoting the Russian government’s interests in the near abroad. 91  Furthermore, 
they often referred to the need to identify instances of potential inter-ethnic tensions through 
early warning—such as in the already mentioned cases of mediation—a desirable objective for 
both minorities and the majority. Subscribing to the NTA system is likely to create higher levels 
of trust between the authorities and NTA institutions by bringing to the fore common goals and 
rules of engagement. In this way, the Russian authorities guide minority institutions towards 
speci¿ c forms of activity and articulation of their demands, to provide greater predictability 
and standardisation of majority–minority exchanges. 
 There are other tangible bene¿ ts stemming from NTA as a ‘culture-only’ framework. 
While far from all NTA institutions have premises, some do have of¿ ces—in some cases 
quite impressive, particularly in an uncertain economic climate. These institutions produce 
outputs such as books (textbooks or literature in minority languages) and, as noted, are behind 
numerous events. Positions in NTA institutions can guarantee respectable occupations: while 
  88  Interview 1.12, with a Finnish NCA representative, St Petersburg, 26 October 2015. 
  89  Interview 4.2, with an academic, Moscow, 30 May 2016. 
  90  Interview 1.12, with a Finnish NCA representative, St Petersburg, 26 October 2015. 
  91  Interview 1.7, with a Tajik NCA representative, Kazan, 18 May 2016; interview 3.1, with a Tajik NGO 
representative, Moscow, 22 April 2016. 
  87  Interview 1.17, with a Jewish NCA representative, Moscow, 21 October 2015. 
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in many cases representatives of NCAs and peoples’ congresses are volunteers, the presence of 
resources (of the community and local/regional authorities) can at times provide for full-time 
positions, with titles such as ‘director’ or ‘president’ of an NCA. And, in the case of small, 
dispersed, non-titular nationalities whose members have scarce resources, any state support, 
even minimal, is all the more valuable. 
 The limitations of formal processes and systems 
 While some bene¿ ts can be reaped from cooperation with the authorities, involvement in 
formal (possibly political) processes does not seem to yield many advantages. Instances cited 
by the respondents in which minority institutions participated in decision-making did not 
challenge the socio-political  status quo ; rather, they manifested themselves primarily at the 
‘micro’ level, and related to speci¿ c, individual cases—as in the case of the minority nurseries 
referred to above, or through assistance in cases of detention. 92  Discreet interventions of this 
type can clearly bene¿ t both parties, yet they do not affect decision-making in the broader 
sense, systems or  modi operandi of state organs. 93  
 The fact that NTA and other ethnicity-based organisations have very restricted opportunities 
for truly independent civic action led those outside the NTA system—mostly the academics 
interviewed—to designate these institutions as having principally a decorative function. 94  
Yet, among the NTA respondents, it was only a handful who considered discussions with the 
authorities untargeted and inconclusive: the majority pointed to the existence of a ‘dialogue’ 
with state organs. At the same time, their statements were generally vague, devoid of references 
to speci¿ c outcomes of debates (despite direct questions on this issue). This might be because 
government policies and laws on minority rights themselves tend to be vague and declarative, 
particularly when linked to Soviet-era narratives of nationalities’ ‘cultural development’: NTA 
respondents might have judged public of¿ cials receptive to their input because exchanges 
remained at a general, abstract level. The same generality and declarative nature of minority-
related law and policies might not, overall, create tangible obstacles to the work of minority 
organisations, which are instead principally constrained by dominant ways of operationalising 
inter-ethnic exchanges. When asked speci¿ c questions on laws and policies governing their 
activities, in most cases the respondents did not refer to particular issues of concern. They 
did not generally consider the registration of an NCA to be in any way complex or reporting 
requirements (that is, for state grants) particularly onerous: these were described as regular 
reporting procedures, common to all organisations, bureaucratic and time-consuming though 
they might be. The ‘Foreign Agents’ Law, despite having direct implications on the work of 
public organisations, 95  was referred to only obliquely by some respondents (although others 
were more critical). 96  Likewise, migration law and policy were generally not criticised by those 
NCAs that provided support to migrant workers: 97  these respondents argued that migrants’ 
hardships primarily stemmed from a lack of knowledge of Russian legislation—a problem that 
  92  As discussed above on p. 16. 
  93  Interview 4.2, with an academic, Moscow, 30 May 2016. 
  94  Interview 4.3, with an academic, Moscow, 22 October 2015; interview 4.4, with an academic, St 
Petersburg, 27 October 2015. 
  95  See below (‘Crimes’ and punishment). 
  96  See below (‘Crimes’ and punishment). 
  97  It was, however, criticised by the representatives of an NGO providing assistance to migrants ( interview 
3.3, Moscow, 30 May 2016). 
 1253 NATIONAL IN FORM, PUTINIST IN CONTENT
could be circumvented through advice and information. Yet Russian and international human 
rights organisations have stressed that Russian immigration legislation is highly complex, 
impractical and very frequently amended, 98  minimising the options for foreign migrants to 
work legally in Russia. 99  Thus, these respondents operated, and cooperated with government 
organs, in line with the latter’s rules of engagement, displaying, again, a general acceptance 
of existing practices. 100  
 The few respondents whose opinions diverged from government narratives gave much 
more detailed answers, perhaps because they had already publicly exposed themselves as 
holding oppositional viewpoints. For example, an ethnic Tatar in Bashkortostan (also an MP 
in the regional  Duma ) criticised the expectation that NCAs be loyal to the state, which, in his 
opinion, limited the scope of action of the regional Tatar NCA in his republic:
 The NCA is an organisation that is loyal towards the local authorities, the local authorities support it. 
Recently there was a conference at a high level, fully supported by the government, and unfortunately 
not a single problem was raised there. 101  
The same respondent stated that raising ‘unusual’ political issues in public settings could 
simply result in their being marginalised, for breaking the unwritten rules of engagement. He 
believed that the principal problem affecting Bashkortostan’s Tatars was the preservation of 
the Tatar language, given the (in his opinion) dwindling efforts to teach it in schools; to the 
question as to whether this issue was raised in the regional  Duma , he replied:
 Unfortunately, we can’t now. Why did I start dealing with politics? I understood that we held meetings, 
we held pickets, [and] issues are not resolved …. To resolve a problem, you need to yourself go 
to an organ of power …. But unfortunately, at the moment, our parliament is completely under the 
control of the organs of state power of the Republic of Bashkortostan. And raising these issues does 
not work, because the majority don’t support [these efforts], for different reasons. Some are afraid 
that this can lead to a conÀ ict, to tensions, [they say] ‘You start raising this issue, and the Bashkirs 
will be against, it can lead to conÀ ict’ …. I tried raising these issues, but they don’t even get to the 
plenary …. At the ¿ rst step, this issue is already suffocated. 102  
  98  See, for example: ‘Russia: Mass Detention of Migrants: Racial Pro¿ ling, Arbitrary Detention, Harsh 
Detention Conditions’, Human Rights Watch, 8 August 2013, available at:  https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/08/
russia-mass-detention-migrants , accessed 8 November 2016; ‘Letter to the UN Special Rapportuer on Human 
Rights of Migrants and UN Independent Expert on Minority Issues’, Human Rights Watch, 16 January 2014, 
available at:  https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/01/16/russia-letter-un-special-rapportuer-human-rights-migrants-
and-un-independent-expert , accessed 8 November 2016; ‘(Third) Opinion on the Russian Federation’, Council 
of Europe ACFC, ACFC/OP/III(2011)010, 24 November 2011, §125–30, available at:  https://rm.coe.int/
CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId==090000168008c6a6 , accessed 
17 March 2017. 
  99  See also Reeves ( 2013 ), Abashin ( 2013 ). 
 100  They might also have realised the limitations of the system but decided to adjust, to bene¿ t from the few 
advantages it offered, possibly hiding their true feelings during interviews. 
 101  Interview 2.4, with a representative of the World Congress of Tatars, Ufa, 26 May 2016. 
 102  Interview 2.4, with a representative of the World Congress of Tatars, Ufa, 26 May 2016. 
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Talking about the World Congress of Tatars (WCT) and its possible impact on Russia’s 
nationalities policy, he said:
 I think that it should impact, it should impact. Again, for what reasons public organisations are 
formed? If it’s only for entertainment, singing songs, dancing, celebrating  sabantui [a Tatar summer 
festival]—for this, such a big organisation is not needed. A smaller organisation would be enough. 
If there is such a big organisation, it should be for the resolution of problems …. At the moment 
[the WCT] is not enough …. Yes, it tries [to do something], it gives us books, textbooks, but for 
the resolution of this problem [the loss of the Tatar language in the republic] it’s not enough to just 
publish books, to hold events, there should be also a political solution. The fact is, for this we need 
to adopt laws, and laws are adopted though politics, through parties, through political solutions. 103  
This brings us to another factor in the non-viability of formal processes and institutions: 
caveats in the Russian legal system. Regional legislation is circumscribed by federal legislation 
within a highly centralised legal and judicial system—centralising trends having consolidated 
under Putin (Hyde  2001 ; Mitin  2008 , p. 58). Meanwhile, the limited practical impact of 
legislation on minority rights, including the NCA Law itself, has meant that legal reform 
has not been a sought-after activity of NTA institutions. 104  For example, a respondent argued 
that the adoption of the NCA Law had not resulted in the creation of a mechanism for its 
implementation; 105  thus, she argued: ‘what is needed is to clearly write down rights and 
responsibilities. If the law says that the state has to develop languages of national minorities, 
let it elaborate on concrete institutions and responsibilities’. The reality, she believed, was 
that ‘the [NCA] law does not work and I do not think that it will be implemented at all’. 106  
This was echoed by another respondent, who, with reference to the NCA Law, stated: ‘As 
it happens in Russia, nobody has any intention to observe it: a law is a law and life is life. 
It is dif¿ cult to bridge these two notions’. 107  The lack of viability of systems, policies and 
laws leads to NTA institutions often having no choice but to become complicit in preserving 
policies that might not—overall—advance their aims. 
 ‘Crimes’ and punishment 
 There are not only few advantages in transcending a ‘culture-only’ framework, but also clear 
risks: the state can employ punitive measures against civil society for engaging in activities 
that are perceived as colliding with dominant government objectives or political narratives. 
For instance, the leader of a network of organisations promoting a minority culture claimed 
that its various branches
 103  Interview 2.4, with a representative of the World Congress of Tatars, Ufa, 26 May 2016. Another respondent 
from Bashkortostan, head of an NGO promoting Tatar culture, including publications on Tatar history, while 
very appreciative of the activities of the WCT, stressed that its scope of action was limited because it was 
con¿ ned to the cultural sphere. She was even less positive about the Tatar NCA, both at the federal and regional 
level, which she considered insuf¿ ciently active. Interview 3.7, Ufa, 23 May 2016. 
 104  The Council of Europe’s ACFC has noted that the rights of NCAs listed in the NCA Law are not supplemented 
by corresponding obligations of the state authorities. See ‘(Third) Opinion on the Russian Federation’, Council 
of Europe ACFC, ACFC/OP/III(2011)010, 24 November 2011, §72, 267, available at:  https://rm.coe.int/
CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId==090000168008c6a6 , accessed 
17 March 2017. 
 105  Interview 1.10, with a Lithuanian NCA representative, Petrozavodsk, 25 April 2016. 
 106  Interview 1.10, with a Lithuanian NCA representative, Petrozavodsk, 25 April 2016. 
 107  Interview 1.9, with a Jewish NCA representative, Petrozavodsk, 25 April 2016. By referring to the absence 
of practical means to realise the law, the respondent meant a lack of funds. 
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 mostly … work in the cultural ¿ eld: supporting their cultural traditions, trying not to engage in 
any kind of political activities. We remind them not to become involved in any kind of political 
activity, since it leads to the closure of the organisation …. When it comes to culture nobody bans 
[an organisation]. 108  
The extremely À exible interpretation of ‘political activity’ could not be shown more clearly 
than in the way the concept has been applied by the Ministry of Justice with reference to the 
2012 ‘Foreign Agents’ Law. 109  Pursuant to this law, any organisation that receives foreign 
funding and engages in ‘political activity’ must register as an ‘organisation performing the 
functions of a foreign agent’. Activities that inÀ uence policy-making and public opinion are 
designated as ‘political’. 110  According to Human Rights Watch, in March 2017 the of¿ cial 
list of active ‘foreign agents’ included 100 organisations. 111  The expression ‘foreign agents’ 
has a clear association with espionage activity, in addition to the law imposing cumbersome 
obligations on reporting on activities and the auditing of foreign funds. 
 As ‘political activity’ can be elastically interpreted, effectively any organisation could be 
encompassed by it. An example is the NGO  Nuori Karjala (Young Karelia), added to the list 
of ‘foreign agents’ for ‘political activity’ that amounted to, ¿ rst, receiving a $10,000 grant 
from the United Nations to conduct training events on linguistic rights for activists promoting 
Finno-Ugric languages in Karelia and, second, hosting a group of foreigners (Finns) in Karelia 
for a study trip. 112  Confronted with having to register as a ‘foreign agent’, the organisation 
closed in August 2015, later re-registering under a different name. 113  A respondent from 
 Nuori Karjala considered the lack of a de¿ nition of ‘political activity’ highly problematic, 
and pointed to the impossibility of separating politics from culture:
 Our organisation is not a political one, it is a national-cultural one, and we have always stressed 
this. However, it is not so easy to separate these spheres. Let us, for example, take the sphere of 
education. The situation with teaching in national minority languages is getting worse and worse. 
I work in this sphere and I know it for sure. It is dif¿ cult to separate culture and politics in this 
particular ¿ eld …. The most dif¿ cult thing is to understand what is ‘political’ activity and whether 
 109  Federal’nyi zakon 121-FZ, ‘O vnesenii izmenenii v otdel’nye zakonodatel’nye akty Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
v chasti regulirovaniya deyatel’nosti nekommercheskikh organizatsii, vypolnyayushchikh funktsii inostrannogo 
agenta’, 20 June 2012, available at:  http://base.garant.ru/70204242/ , accessed 17 March 2017. 
 110  The law states that: ‘A non-commercial organisation … is considered to take part in political activity … if 
… it participates … in the organisation and implementation of political actions with the objective of impacting 
on decision-making by the state organs, with a view to changing their policies, and also [if it participates] in 
the formation of public opinion’. This paragraph was added by the ‘Foreign Agents’ Law to Art. 2 of a 1996 
law: Federal’nyi zakon 7-FZ, ‘O nekommercheskikh organizatsiyakh’, 2 January 1996, available at:  http://
base.garant.ru/10105879/ , accessed 17 March 2017. 
 111  A total of 158 organisations was included in the list; in 22 cases the ‘foreign agent’ status was later 
revoked, while 33 organisations ultimately shut down. See, ‘Russia: Government vs. Rights Groups: The Battle 
Chronicle’, Human Rights Watch, 24 October 2016, available at:  https://www.hrw.org/russia-government-
against-rights-groups-battle-chronicle , accessed 17 March 2017. 
 112  Various organisations promoting environmental protection have also been targeted. See ‘Another Nature 
Conservancy Group Falls Afoul of Russia’s “Foreign Agent” Law’, Bellona, 16 September 2015, available 
at:  http://bellona.org/news/russian-human-rights-issues/russian-ngo-law/2015-09-another-nature-conservancy-
group-falls-afoul-of-russias-foreign-agent-law , accessed 8 November 2016. 
 113  ‘Killing an Indigenous NGO, Softly: A Tale from Putin’s Russia’,  Uralistica , 28 September 2015, available 
at:  http://uralistica.com/pro¿ les/blogs/killing-an-indigenous-ngo-softly-a-tale-from-putin-s-russia , accessed 8 
November 2016. 
 108  Interview 3.2, with the representative of a Ukrainian NGO, Moscow, 16 May 2016. 
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what you are doing quali¿ es or not. It depends on the authorities, on how they decide …. We are 
not aggressive or negative towards the authorities, however we are in such circumstances, we work 
in such a ¿ eld—languages of national minorities—that we have to deal with the authorities, and 
somehow deal with political issues. 114  
Another respondent observed that the fuzziness of the expression ‘political activity’ caused 
her to wonder: ‘maybe the fact that we’re meeting here [giving an interview to a foreign 
researcher] is already a political activity, who knows?’. 115  
 The overlapping of politics and minority issues has further been linked to security issues 
and at times ‘extremism’. Calls for switching the alphabet from Cyrillic to Latin for the Tatar 
language in Tatarstan were linked to threats to national security (Derrick  2009 , p. 55). The 
Russian authorities tend to err on the side of caution: organisations have been found guilty 
of extremism under Russian law—and their documents placed on a Federal List of Extremist 
Materials 116  or their webpages blocked—even when not posing a direct threat to public order. 117  
 According to a respondent, raising politically unpalatable questions in the federal  Duma 
during discussions on inter-ethnic issues resulted in his later being excluded from subsequent 
consultations. 118  Another respondent, who had been elected as the deputy leader of a regional 
Tatar NCA, argued that his conciliatory but not unequivocally pro-government approach would 
always preclude him from becoming the main leader of the institution. 119  While it is dif¿ cult to 
corroborate this type of information, the leader herself, who was also interviewed, displayed 
positions that fully mirrored the ‘of¿ cial line’. 120  Raising controversial issues—not (politically) 
aligned with government positions—can indeed be problematic. A respondent, a member of a 
minority NGO in Kazan, referred to the case of a member of the nationalist organisation Tatar 
Public Centre, Ra¿ s Kashapov, who in 2015 was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment on 
the grounds of inciting ethnic hatred and separatism for condemning Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea. 121  Another respondent, the head of a regional Ukrainian NCA, reported receiving threats 
from the Federal Security Service (FSB) for his ‘support of Ukraine’s territorial integrity’. 122  
 114  Interview 3.6, with the representative of a Karelian NGO, Petrozavodsk, 27 April 2016. 
 115  Interview 1.10, with a Lithuanian NCA representative, Petrozavodsk, 25 April 2016. 
 116  Pursuant to Art. 13, Federal’nyi zakon 114-FZ, ‘O protivodeistvii ekstremistkoi deyatel’nosti’, 25 July 
2002, available at;  http://base.garant.ru/12127578/ ; and Ukaz Prezidenta RF ‘Voprosy Ministerstva yustitsii 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ 1313, 13 October 2004, available at:  http://base.garant.ru/12137238/ , accessed 17 March 
2017. The list of ‘extremist’ materials can be found at:  http://minjust.ru/ru/extremist-materials , accessed 17 
March 2017. Materials are declared ‘extremist’ by a court of law. This has occurred even when materials 
have not directly incited violence or social hatred. The list had over 3,200 items in 2016 (see ‘Inappropriate 
Enforcement of Anti-Extremist Legislation in Russia in 2015’, SOVA, 3 June 2016, available at:  http://www.
sova-center.ru/en/misuse/reports-analyses/2016/06/d34694/ , accessed 1 November 2016). 
 117  The SOVA Center for Information and Analysis argues that the vagueness of Russia’s extremism 
provisions has been employed to prosecute political opponents or simply non-mainstream groups. See, 
‘Inappropriate Enforcement of Anti-Extremist Legislation in Russia in 2015’, SOVA, 3 June 2016, available at: 
 http://www.sova-center.ru/en/misuse/reports-analyses/2016/06/d34694/ , accessed 8 November 2016. 
 118  Interview 3.3, with the representatives of an NGO providing assistance to migrants, Moscow, 30 May 2016. 
 119  Interview 1.13, with a Tatar NCA representative, Ufa, 25 May 2016. 
 120  Another respondent stressed the alignment to of¿ cial positions of the leader of one of the peoples’ 
congresses. Interview 3.6, with the representative of a Karelian NGO, Petrozavodsk, 27 April 2016. Moreover, 
some respondents, while not referring to direct manipulation of voting systems for the election of leaders of 
NCAs and peoples’ congresses, spoke about indirect ways to inÀ uence voting patterns. Interview 1.13, with 
a Tatar NCA representative, Ufa, 25 May 2016; interview 3.6, with the representative of a Karelian NGO, 
Petrozavodsk, 27 April 2016. See also Abramov ( 2010 ) on the Mordovian people’s congress. 
 121  Interview 3.8, with a Tatar NGO representative, Kazan, 20 May 2016. 
 122  Interview 1.14, with a Ukrainian NCA representative (location not disclosed to guarantee the respondent’s 
anonymity), 24 April 2016. 
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 The implications of remaining ‘outside politics’ 
 Some respondents found constraining the fact that state-supported programmes on minority 
cultures required moulding themselves around existing, dominant narratives—particularly the 
Soviet concept of ‘friendship of peoples’, itself situated within a Russian patriotic framework. 
These respondents perceived the activities they engaged in, which required adjusting to this 
framework, as not ultimately conducive to the preservation of minority languages and cultures. 
For example, an (already cited) respondent believed that inter-ethnic festivals did not address 
the needs of his community, but rather amounted to a super¿ cial attempt at demonstrating 
an attention to diversity. 123  By contrast, the respondent had requested funding from the local 
authorities to address what he and his colleagues considered its ‘real needs’: the production 
of a newspaper; scholarships for young people to attend specialised university courses on 
the community’s language and culture (with a view to feeding the newly acquired skills back 
into the group); intensive language courses (training teachers and compiling textbooks); and 
support for a museum. There had been no reply from the local authorities. 124  While in other 
regions initiatives relating to language courses and museums have been supported, 125  inter-
ethnic festivals have remained the centrepiece of programmes for the promotion of minority 
cultures. 126  The cited respondent’s own interpretation of the lack of support was that ‘it is not 
interesting [for the authorities] to give real support, with a real product. It’s more interesting 
to make some loud event, some coloured—coloured by local people—event’. 127  The scarcity 
of resources is a problem that often affects NTA (and other ethnic) organisations, limiting 
their scope of action even if they remain within the realm of languages and cultures. 128  If the 
respondent was correct in his interpretation, this situation can create a vicious cycle by which 
organisations wishing to gain ¿ nancial support do not propose projects that are innovative 
or target speci¿ c needs. It suggests a scenario in which the state might not aim at enhanced 
accommodation of minorities and their cultural rights, but rather the preservation of the 
existing inter-ethnic equilibrium, by con¿ ning the expression of ethnic identity to repetitive 
cultural production. On the subject of ethnic festivals, the respondent added a particularly 
poignant observation:
 123  Interview 3.5, with the representative of a (Finno-Ugric) ethnicity-based NGO, St Petersburg, 27 October 
2015. 
 124  These activities had been proposed mid-2015 to the relevant municipal authorities, after a call to ethnic 
organisations to submit their proposed plans of activities for 2016, to be considered for ¿ nancial support. A 
reply, whether positive or negative, has to be provided within 30 days, but—the respondent said—the proposal 
and subsequent correspondence had remained unanswered by the time the interview took place (October 2015). 
 125  This type of decision seems to be also linked to the preferences and inclinations of particular public 
of¿ cials in different regions. See also Prina ( 2016 , pp. 207, 224). 
 126  A focus on (folkloristic) festivals can be observed in Russia’s reports to the Council of Europe Advisory 
Commission on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (ACFC), in which 
these events feature prominently. For example, see ‘(Third) Report submitted by the Russian Federation’, 
Council of Europe ACFC, ACFC/SR/III(2010)005, 9 April 2010, pp. 30–43, available at:  https://rm.coe.int/
CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId==090000168008b7c3 , accessed 
17 March 2017. 
 127  Interview 3.5, with the representative of a (Finno-Ugric) ethnicity-based NGO, St Petersburg, 27 October 
2015. 
 128  As noted, funding from abroad is restricted by the ‘Foreign Agents’ Law. Even before its adoption there 
were obstacles to the receipt of foreign funding (see Prina  2016 , pp. 168–74). 
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 I can compare us to circus dogs, when children say: ‘I want to see the dogs play football’. And we are 
such dogs. So the government would like to show how they support these people [persons belonging 
to national minorities], and that these people are coming [to attend events]. 129  
Paradoxically, within this cultural  milieu , the same respondent also referred to a (government-
driven) politicisation of culture, in the sense that events and discourses around ethnic diversity 
could be manipulated by political actors to produce particular outcomes in political processes. 
For example, he described what was ostensibly a cultural event celebrating ethnic diversity in 
his region, which took place (strategically, he suggested) immediately prior to gubernatorial 
elections, and which was a ‘very, very politicised event’. The concert—the event’s highlight—
was preceded by one hour of self-promotion by the incumbent. He added:
 Everybody understands it clearly, all participants. And it was a pity, I was very sad for our old 
people who went there to represent the district … because they are tired of it, they are tired of being 
a decoration. They would like to receive real support. 130  
Another respondent referred to events that incorporated pro-government propaganda and 
promotion of UR. 131  Thus, festivals could then be employed as ‘decoration’—to use the 
respondent’s expression—around more pressing objectives that transcend culture, such as 
the consolidation of the existing socio-political order. As a result, an outsider to the system 
(an academic) echoed a civil society respondent (cited above) in saying that the demarcation 
line between political and cultural spheres of activities is more blurred than it is purported to 
be. 132  It is primarily the state that shapes rules of engagement and is the ‘producer’ of both 
culture and politics. Again, it is reminiscent of Soviet practices of inducing absorption into 
the Party as the only manifestation of politics. As Hirsch writes: ‘in the Soviet Union, where 
all spheres were politicized, all forms of participation—going to a museum, critiquing and 
an exhibit, writing in a comment book—were political acts’ (Hirsch  2005 , p. 226). In such a 
scenario the ‘cultural’ and the ‘political’ become hardly distinguishable. 
 In light of this, some respondents from minority organisations expressed their disagreement 
with the overly enthusiastic depiction of Russia’s model of diversity management by 
representatives of the Russian authorities. 133  They further opposed the requirement of loyalty: 
for example, one respondent argued that in a society there should also be space for radical 
views that involved opposition to mainstream politics. 134  Talking about members of the 
nationalist Tatar Public Centre in Ufa, he said:
 129  Interview 3.5, with the representative of a (Finno-Ugric) ethnicity-based NGO, St Petersburg, 27 October 
2015. 
 130  Interview 3.5, with the representative of a (Finno-Ugric) ethnicity-based NGO, St Petersburg, 27 October 
2015. 
 131  Interview 3.6, with the representative of a Karelian NGO, Petrozavodsk, 27 April 2016. 
 132  Interview 4.3, with an academic, Moscow, 22 October 2015. 
 133  Interview 1.2, with representatives of a German NCA, Kazan, 21 May 2016; interview 1.10, with a 
Lithuanian NCA, Petrozavodsk, 25 April 2016; interview 1.12, with a Finnish NCA, St Petersburg, 26 October 
2015; interview 3.5, with a (Finno-Ugric) ethnicity-based NGO, St Petersburg, 27 October 2015; interview 
3.6, with a Karelian NGO, Petrozavodsk, 27 April 2016. 
 134  Interview 2.4, with a representative of the World Congress of Tatars, Ufa, 26 May 2016. 
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 First, they are radical, and second … there remains, for the most part, old people …. The organisation 
is alive but unfortunately not strong …. But in principle I believe that such an organisation should 
exist—a radical organisation should  also exist, because if all organisations will just be loyal, or just 
say that all is ¿ ne, all is alright, then there will not be a movement forward. If we want some kind 
of progress there should be different views, including radical views. 135  
In his opinion, this was the polar opposite of the regional Tatar NCA. 136  A ‘culture-only’ 
framework amounted to acquiescence which did not allow for such a ‘movement forward’. 
These respondents’ rejection of the system of diversity management can be likened to 
Geremek’s description of dissidents under communism and their ‘refusal to participate in 
falsehood’ (Geremek  1992 , p. 3). 137  
 Conclusion 
 Through NTA institutions, and ethnic policies more broadly, Russia’s narratives of ‘cultural 
development’ of ethnic groups, already widespread in the Soviet period, have been consolidated. 
While NTA respondents had differing perceptions of ‘politics’, they generally expressed 
the view that their activities had—and should continue to have—a (near-)exclusive cultural 
dimension, perhaps dictated by a form of ‘cultural purism’ on which their work was seen to 
hinge. This replicates a folkloristic and ethnographic—as well as ‘apolitical’—approach to 
inter-ethnic relations, as the activities of ethnic institutions continue to be guided by cultural 
schemas that persist as powerful Soviet legacies. 
 By primarily positioning themselves as cultural (and/or educational) centres, respondents 
from NTA institutions often indicated that politics, policies and laws were relatively 
unimportant to them. Many seemed satis¿ ed with the existing institutional design in the 
sphere of diversity management and displayed a general acceptance of (or acquiescence to) 
existing processes, despite restricted opportunities to inÀ uence decision-making on matters 
affecting them. They referred to the presence of dialogue with the authorities or, at times, 
avenues to inÀ uence some processes indirectly. Even the (far fewer) respondents who were 
openly critical of the system for diversity management only rarely expressed a wish to engage 
in political processes. Rather, they would have welcomed more substantial and wider-ranging 
opportunities in the cultural sphere, so as to better preserve their ethno-cultural and linguistic 
distinctiveness. The very small minority who were vocal about the need for political solutions 
to their concerns argued that the present political environment was not conducive to them. 
 Meanwhile, minority institutions opting to remain within the con¿ nes of ‘cultural 
development’ of nationalities have adjusted to the country’s political reality: an environment 
with limited room for manoeuvre, where the trajectory of ‘development’ is circumscribed, and 
where of¿ cialdom provides the overarching framework and meta-narratives through which 
 135  Interview 2.4, with a representative of the World Congress of Tatars, Ufa, 26 May 2016. The Tatar Public 
Centre had been prominent in the 1990s. In the opinion of the interviewee, the reason why the organisation’s 
members were ‘radical’ was that they had nothing to lose: ‘these people are pensioners, old, and they are not 
afraid of anything … they are retired, they have a pension’. In the respondent’s opinion, younger people are 
more preoccupied about their future, especially if they have or are planning a family. 
 136  Interview 2.4, with a representative of the World Congress of Tatars, Ufa, 26 May 2016. See also a citation 
by the same respondent on the Tatar NCA, p. 19. 
 137  This refusal can turn political inaction into political action (Geremek  1992 , p. 4). 
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minority cultures may be expressed. 138  NTA institutions sometimes ful¿ l important social 
functions in a dif¿ cult socio-political climate, with micro-interventions that can be of direct 
bene¿ t to individuals. They receive a form of social recognition and make use of some channels 
for the expression of their cultural uniqueness. At the same time, even in the cultural sphere, 
NTA opportunities are restricted by the paucity of resources, the absence of mechanisms of 
implementation of minority laws and policies, and a centralised political system. A distance 
from ‘politics’ can result in an absence of inÀ uence (both in the cultural and political spheres) 
that is only partially resolved through the use of informal practices and networks. 
 A small number of respondents from minority NGOs and (less often) NTA institutions 
expressed their dissatisfaction in interviews and, at times, their refusal to participate in what 
they considered ‘falsehood’, to use Geremek’s expression ( 1992 , p. 3). They saw very limited 
scope for independent action or agency within political processes, while ethnic institutions 
were often mobilised by the regime in support of its objectives. Yet deviation from existing 
narratives—transcending culture to cross into (non-mainstream) ‘political activity’—can be 
penalised, as any activity may be labelled as political and/or ‘extremist’. The founding of an 
organisation such as an NCA can then be a protective measure, signalling a willingness to 
remain within the con¿ nes of the existing socio-political order and eclipse alternative (non-
state) loyalties. One can thus differentiate between active involvement in political processes and 
having a function within a (politicised) cultural environment—the latter a trend that could be 
described as ‘national in form, Putinist in content’. While NTA institutions have few avenues to 
advance minority rights through political or quasi-political processes, their activities are infused 
with politics, creating a system in which culture and (mainstream) politics ultimately converge. 
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 Appendix.  Cited respondents 
 Category  Code 
 Ethnicity 
(if declared)  Gender  Interview location  Interview date 
 1. NCA  1.1  German  M  Kazan  21 May 2016 
 1.2  German  M  Moscow  27 May 2016 
 1.3  Azerbaijani  F  Moscow  23 October 2015 
 1.4  Tatar  F  Kazan  24 June 2015 
 1.5  Azerbaijani  M  St Petersburg  28 October 2015 
 1.6  Armenian  M  Kazan  20 May 2016 
 1.7  Tajik  M  Kazan  18 May 2016 
 1.8  Uzbek  M  Kazan  17 May 2016 
 1.9  Jewish  M  Petrozavodsk  25 April 2016 
 1.10  Lithuanian  M  Petrozavodsk  25 April 2016 
 1.11  Tatar  F  Ufa  23 May 2016 
 1.12  Finno-Ugric*  M  St Petersburg  26 October 2015 
 1.13  Tatar  M  Ufa  25 May 2016 
 1.14  Ukrainian  M  U nspeci¿ ed to 
guarantee anonymity† 
 24 April 2016 
 1.15  Ukrainian  F  Saransk  17 June 2015 
 1.16  Jewish  M  Saransk  16 June 2015 
 1.17  Jewish  F  Moscow  21 October 2015 
 2. People’s congress   2.1  Mordovian  M  Moscow  20 October 2015 
 2.2  Mordovian  M  Saransk  18 June 2015 
 2.3  Mordovian  M  Saransk  19 June 2015 
 2.4  Tatar  M  Ufa  26 May 2016 
 3. NGO  3.1  Tajik  M  Moscow  22 April 2016 
 3.2  Ukrainian  F  Moscow  16 May 2016 
 3.3  Chechen  M  Moscow  30 May 2016 
 3.4  Finno-Ugric*  F  St Petersburg  28 October 2015 
 3.5  Finno-Ugric*  M  St Petersburg  27 October 2015 
 3.6  Karelian  F  Petrozavodsk  27 April 2016 
 3.7  Tatar  F  Ufa  23 May 2016 
 3.8  Tatar  M  Kazan  20 May 2016 
 4. Academia  4.1  N/A  F  St Petersburg  30 October 2015 
 4.2  N/A  M  Moscow  30 May 2016 
 4.3  N/A  M  Moscow  22 October 2015 
 4.4  N/A  M  St Petersburg  27 October 2015 
 Notes : * Other than Mordovian; † the information provided by the respondent might compromise him/her if identi¿ ed. 
 
